Biosafety Cabinets, Containment Facility Maintenance, and More Question
Even if a biosafety cabinet continuously passes certification tests against NSF49, should the filter be changed after a certain period of time? Is there an industry standard on this? Is gasket shrinkage a concern after 10 or even 20 years?
Answer
If the biosafety cabinet passes the NSF testing each year, there is no problem and the filter does not have to be replaced. Any damage to the gaskets would be recognized during the testing and, if found, would constitute a reason to replace the filter. Filters actually work better with time. In labs that are clean, I've personally seen biosafety cabinets in continuous operation for over 10 years with no problems. Yearly testing and clean labs make for safe cabinets.
Question
I have a facilities maintenance group that is panicking over decontamination of some secondary containment systems in our BSL-3 containment facility. The manufacturer has not been helpful in assisting in the decontamination process and does not appear to be concerned that some areas of the equipment may need to be decontaminated and serviced. Facilities maintenance wanted to know who would decon these systems and the vendor was not too accommodating. Should we develop a decon plan of our own, or should we try to get the vendor to provide the service?
Answer
This is a problem that has two aspects and that seems to come up only after the facility has been in operation for a period of time. The two areas of concern are: 1) per-ception of maintenance personnel that all areas of biocontainment labs are contaminated and decontamination is difficult and risky; and 2) some vendors are interested in selling their product and moving on without reviewing the potential hazards associated with the need to repair the equipment.
It is important in the start-up of any biocontainment laboratory to involve and train the personnel who will be responsible for the preventive maintenance regarding the actual probabilities of contamination of systems and how to handle their decontamination. This means that the biosafety professional must be proactive in ensuring that a program be in place to cover any contingencies with regard to the repair of the critical systems in the containment laboratory. This program must cover not only information regarding the potential for contamination, but also the mechanisms/protocols for decontamination of the systems and equipment. In addition, it should be evident to the maintenance personnel that the containment facility management is concerned about protecting them from potential exposure. Such a program must include training scientific personnel regarding the operation of the facility and the need for strict adherence to the safety protocols while working in the facility.
With regard to the second point, vendors must be held accountable for ensuring that the equipment they manufacture and sell can be appropriately decontaminated and serviced. A review of the operation of the systems and equipment by the biosafety professionals early in the process of design and acceptance by management that a risk assessment must be performed will assist in minimizing the problems that invariably arise after the facility is in operation. Vendors must be able to answer the tough questions posed by the reviewers and provide reasonable answers or solutions to questions posed. When operating a biocontainment facility, it is unacceptable to purchase from a vendor that cannot provide answers and solutions to questions regarding the preventive maintenance of its product.
Prior to initiating work in a new biocontainment facility, it is imperative that the facility management, in conjunction with the biosafety professional, develops the appropriate contingency plans for decontamination and repair of critical equipment. Waiting until something catastrophic happens to develop such plans will result in loss of research time and increased costs, not to mention loss of credibility with the maintenance personnel required to keep the facility operational. 
Question
When removing PPE as an individual is leaving a BSL-3 laboratory room, the process of taking off a Tyvek suit/foot covers properly is a challenge. Can a scientist's street shoes ever touch the floor of a BSL-3 laboratory or can this contact occur only in a "gray zone" adjacent to the exit door? Can bare hands ever touch the handle of the exit door? Can a scientist sit down on a chair in a BSL-3 suite while removing PPE and have his/her street clothes in contact with the chair (which is the chair at a Class II BSC)?
Answer
You bring up some good points that need to be addressed because there are misconceptions about biocontainment labs. First, these laboratories are not contaminated unless a spill has occurred outside the biosafety cabinet, so the use of excessive PPE is not generally warranted in the lab. Certainly, things like foot covers are not necessary and even the use of Powered Air Purifying Respirators (PAPRs) may be excessive since the work is supposed to be performed within the primary containment device, the BSC.
In my experience, about 10% of the people using biosafety cabinets actually know how they work and the limitations of working in them. In over 20 years of teaching laboratory safety, I have given classes a quiz asking how many of the students have BSCs in their labs and how many of them know exactly how the BSC works.
During this time about 10% of the students actually know the answer. It is probably good that folks are wearing PPE. However, it is more important that we teach them how to use the primary safety equipment and reduce the reliance on PPE. That is the OSHA position on this issue as well.
So to answer your questions: 1. Tyvek suits and shoe covers are probably overkill in most BSL-3 labs-they are not necessary. 2. BSL-3 labs are not contaminated rooms; anyone can walk through them without fear of contaminating his or her shoes. 3. Yes, bare hands can touch the handle of the door to the room because it is not contaminated unless someone working in the lab has touched the door handle with contaminated gloves-another training and supervisory issue. 4. Yes, a scientist or anyone else who has permission to be in the lab can sit down and have contact with any chair in the lab. The chairs should not be expected to be contaminated.
In the absence of a catastrophic spill or accident outside of primary containment, BSL-3 facilities are clean areas. One thing we forget when discussing BSL-3 labs is that these labs generally are working with agents that are present in the natural environment, not exotic "deadly" agents. Our emphasis should be on a realistic risk assessment and ensuring that the procedures are correct, reasonable, and followed. The engineering safety devices are only as good as the folks who are using them.
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Free Downloads from the Journal Human Gene Therapy
If your Institutional Biosafety Committee reviews human gene transfer trials, members may want to review the commentaries, editorials, and reviews that are available as free downloads from the Journal Human Gene Therapy at www.liebertonline.com/toc/hum/19/1. Some downloads include:
Commentaries "Case of Leukaemia Associated with X-Linked Severe Combined Immunodeficiency Gene Therapy Trial in London" "If It's Broken, Shouldn't It Be Fixed? Informed Consent and Initial Clinical Trials of Gene Therapy" "Informed Consent in Human Gene Transfer Clinical Trials" "Protections for Participants in Gene Therapy Trials: A Patient's Perspective" "Human Gene Therapy, Consent, and the Realities of Clinical Research: Is It Time for a Research Subject Advocate?"
Editorial "Adverse Events in Gene Transfer Trials and an Agenda for the New Year"
Review "Advances in MicroRNAs: Implications for Gene Therapists" by Rebecca T. Marquez and Anton P. McCaffrey
